Highly unlikely. As June begins, which marks the end of the LPDF Roadmap’s 18 months timeline, let’s see why:
1. The success of the Cairo track is doubtful. Although participants said they agreed on 70% of the amendments to the #CDA proposal, the 30% remaining could be the hardest ones to reach an agreement upon! The third meeting is planned mid-June.
2. Even if the constitutional track worked out, and HSC/HoR agreed on a constitutional basis and elections laws by August, #HSC member AbdelQader Hawili recently stated in a press interview that elections could not happen before March 2023.
3. Even if the process succeeds, its legal basis is fragile and could be challenged: is it the implementation of the 12th Amendment (which was rejected by #HSC?) Or is it the UN-led process (which was refused by #HoR)?
4. Elected CDA members have clearly opposed any effort to amend their draft and said that the only legal way is to put it straight to referendum as it is, and let Libyans decide if they like it or not! Writing an entirely new Constitution is also a violation of the CDA process
5. The current proposal of Abdelhamid Dabaiba, PM of the #GNU, is to hold elections in each regions separately, and even to rely on the CCMCE (local elections commission) to do so, which is legally questionable.
The committee he created to prepare the elections laws faced many issues, including 4 members resigning from it, citing lack of seriousness as a reason for their withdrawal.
6. Until now, the Presidency Council, whose legitimacy comes from the LPDF roadmap ending this month, remained discrete. But some said that it could freeze the Parliament soon, and decide to rule by decree – in an effort to unlock the current situation.
With these delays, spoilers, and lack of political will, even if elections are confirmed, HNEC will have to re-do the whole registration process In the meantime, the 2.8 million Libyans who registered last year have seen their right to vote taken away from them.